Cyberspace, sovereignty, and international law

Abstract

This paper analyzes the applicability of Public International Law in cyberspace, focusing on the concept of digital sovereignty and the increasing use of the cyber domain as a theater for interstate conflict. Through emblematic case studies—such as the cyberattacks on Estonia (2007), the Stuxnet operation (2010), electoral interference in the United States (2016), and hybrid warfare in Ukraine (2014–2017)—it explores the limitations of current legal frameworks regarding attribution, regulation, and response to cyber operations. The article further examines the evolution of cyberspace as an operational domain for armed forces and the normative efforts by organizations such as the UN, NATO, and individual states. It concludes that the lack of binding legal mechanisms, along
with the necessity for sovereign technological infrastructure, demands a reconsideration of the relationship between technical capacity and international norms. The deployment of national technologies such as IXP, BGP, and AS systems could strengthen digital sovereignty and support the enforcement of international law.