The auction model with lower risk in duopolistic electricity market

Authors

  • Estrella Alonso
  • Juan Tejada

Keywords:

JEL: D44

Abstract

The present paper models the electricity market auction as a two-person game with incomplete information under the assumption that bidders are symmetric, risk neutral and have independent private costs. Alonso and Tejada (2010) define an extensive parametric family of auction models which contains the classic auction models; Uniform, Discriminatory and Vickrey auction models. The present paper analyzes this parametric family of auction models from the viewpoint of the risk. It develops a new auction model called DV, which has lower risk than any other classic auction model.

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Published

2012-12-30

How to Cite

Alonso, E., & Tejada, J. (2012). The auction model with lower risk in duopolistic electricity market. Económica, 58, p. 3–21. Retrieved from https://revistas.unlp.edu.ar/Economica/article/view/5356

Issue

Vol. 58 (2012)

Section

Articles

License

The material published in the journal is distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International (CC BY-NC-ND 4.0) license. This license requires proper credit to be given, a link to the license to be provided, and changes to be indicated. It does not permit commercial use of the work, and if the work is remixed, transformed, or otherwise modified, distribution of such modification is not allowed.