Estructura organizativa de la empresa y disuasión a la entrada
Keywords:
recursos humanos, gerencia, JEL: L20, L22, D82Abstract
In this paper we analyze the choice of how a firm organizes itself with regard to the degree of centralization of production decisions, as a way of deterring entry by the manager of the firm. We show that if the fixed cost of setting up a new firm is low enough, the owner of the firm chooses a centralized organizational form.
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