El impacto de los programas y la condicionalidad del FMI en los derechos laborales

Su-Hyun Lee; Byungwon Woo

doi:10.24215/25251678e488

Authors

Su-Hyun Lee RSIS/NTU. Facultad de Estudios Internacionales S. Rajaratnam, Universidad Tecnológica de Nanyang, Singapur
Byungwon Woo Universidad Yonsei, Corea del Sur

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.24215/25251678e488

Abstract

Do International Monetary Fund (IMF) programs and conditions make harm to labor rights in program-participating countries? Critics of the IMF contend that participation in an IMF program is detrimental to workers’ rights as the IMF tries to impose pro-business labor policies via conditionality when a country has no choice but to participate in a program. Countering the criticisms, the IMF management has stepped up its rhetoric on how IMF programs try to promote inclusive growth, providing productive employment, and protecting the most vulnerable population within a country. In this paper, we argue that while the IMF might have tried to make IMF programs more beneficial to workers, those efforts are too little to reverse the overall negative effects on labor rights in both short term and long term. This is not only because of direct policy changes mandated in IMF programs but also because of indirect consequences of liberalization of the economy. We demonstrate that IMF programs with stricter labor-market conditions have more detrimental effects on both de jure labor rights and de facto labor practices. Our analysis also highlights the importance of domestic politics and shows that negative overall effects of IMF programs can be offset when a participating government is leftist or when a country adopts a proportional representation system.

Author Biographies

Su-Hyun Lee , RSIS/NTU. Facultad de Estudios Internacionales S. Rajaratnam, Universidad Tecnológica de Nanyang, Singapur

Profesora asistente de la Facultad de Estudios Internacionales S. Rajaratnam, Universidad Tecnológica de Nanyang, Singapur (RSIS/NTU). Su Hyun Lee agradece a la Facultad de Estudios Internacionales S. Rajaratnam de la Universidad Tecnológica de Nanyang (RSIS/ NTU, siglas en inglés) por su generosa ayuda económica. Contacto: isshlee@ntu.edu.sg
Byungwon Woo, Universidad Yonsei, Corea del Sur

Profesor asociado del Departamento de Ciencias Políticas y Estudios Internacionales, Universidad Yonsei, Corea del Sur. El autor Byungwon Woo agradece la generosa ayuda económica recibida de parte de la Universidad Yonsei a través del Fondo de Investigación de 2019-22-0017. Contacto: bwwoo@yonsei.ac.kr

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