Truth, justification and judgment

Abstract

This article seeks to analyze, from an epistemological perspective, what we call “truth” and its impact on trial and criminal process, starting from the requirement of true character of the facts that are stated as a prerequisite for the imposition of a penalty, and considering judgment as a process of justification of that “truth”, taking into consideration the remnant of inqui[1]sitorial procedural model where the object of the process was the search for an abstract truth in an objective and immutable way. Search for truth as the object of the process is no longer pursued, but search for justification of a claim to truth; neither the search for an abstract or generic truth, but rather for a truth predetermined by the pretension. It performs an analysis of what is meant by “truth” and how it is reached, examining it from experience -linguistically structured and inserted in contexts with others (intersubjective experience)-, and taking into account the development of truth at a discursive praxis and argumentation plane. Haberma’s thought is also approached, along with the relation between truth and justification that he argues (justifi[1]cation of a claim to truth at the discursive plane, which implies an authorization to return to the plane of action and be guided by that justification as an unconditional truth). Finally, judgment and criminal process are observed from the fundaherentismo” current, and how it is closely linked to both of them.