Una constitución para la paz: federalismo y consociacitivismo en Bosnia y Herzegovina

Palabras clave: Bosnia y Herzeogvina, federalismo, consociaciativismo, justicia transicional

Resumen

El presente artículo analiza la Constitución de Bosnia y Herzegovina, producto del Acuerdo de Paz de Dayton, con el objeto de explicar cómo los elementos del federalismo y el consociaciativismo pueden convertirse en herramientas fundamentales en el ámbito de la justicia transicional. Al combinar el federalismo y el consociacitivismo, se tratará de mostrar cómo el gobierno compartido y el autogobierno pueden ser útiles para abordar las demandas de más autonomía y autogobierno por parte de los grupos étnicos concentrados territorialmente, al tiempo que preservan la integridad territorial del estado. También explica el rol que ocupan los procesos de diseño constitucional posconflicto para reconciliar diferentes grupos, abordar agravios intolerables y prevenir una mayor polarización al proporcionar una visión común de futuro para un Estado.

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Biografía del autor/a

Francisco Aras, Pontificia Universidad Católica Argentina, Argentina

Abogado (UCA). Master of Laws (Columbia University).

Citas

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Publicado
2020-12-18