Pseudo equilibrios de expectativas: algunos ejemplos macroeconómicos
Abstract
This paper explores instances of coordination failures in intertemporal decisions. The context is one where agents try to interpret the behavior of others as it is revealed by market variables. The paper shows examples where, if agents postulate that market data necessarily result from actions based on correct expectations, it is possible that decisions predicated on inconsistent forecasts are sustained as temporary equilibria. In those states the individuals may find no reason to revise their current actions, as the values of observed market data seem consistent with their initial beliefs, even if these are mistaken. The examples show cases of "self-validated" states based on erroneous expectations: their existence derives from the way in which agents conjecture future "fundamental conditions" from the observation of current aggregate data, give their assumptions about how other individuals are forming their own forecasts. The "pseudo-equilibria" are not analogous to "self-fulfilling prophecies", since eventually expectations will be frustrated and plans revised.
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