Bonos, incentivos gerenciales, eficiencia y control en la empresa pública
Keywords:
incentivos salariales, gerenciaAbstract
The work studies the use of managerial bonus schemes in public enterprises, designed by a principal (Ministry) to provide incentives for managerial (cost-reducing) as well as allocative (pricing) efficiency. The Ministry can measure the demand function and obtain information about costs (but no the cost function), profits, prices and quantities. It is shown that the Ministry solves both problems offering the Manager a contract that adopts a "pure-rent" or "lump-sum" form, i. e. It pays him the sum of consumer and producer surpluses less a fee. This result is extended to the case when the Ministry does not possess information about demand. Previous results obtained by Gravelle (1982) and Finisinger and Vogelsang (1982) are reconsidered.
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