From “Lubanga” to “Ongwen”: Gender-based reparations at the International Criminal Court

Abstract

Two decades after the beginning of the International Criminal Court (ICC), today we can claim that this court's procedural practice has implied a true turn in the way that the role played by victims in the international criminal system is understood. For the very first time their right to take part in the process and to receive reparations is actually being recognized. In order to be considered as victims, either natural or juridical persons need to prove that they have sustained some damage as a result of the commission of a crime within the jurisdiction of the ICC. That is to say, following the “proximate cause” criterion, victims must prove that a crime is sufficiently related to the damage, thus making it its cause. In its latest decisions, the ICC has been making a broader interpretation of this criterion and widened the types of damage included and, therefore, the victims who may take part in the proceedings or be granted reparations. This work deals with some of these decisions, paying special attention to the transgenerational trauma suffered by children born to women who were victims of sexual and gender violence. The question we set out to answer here, then, is whether the ICC is actually complying with the gender requirement included in article 54.1. b of the Rome Statute.