Reflexiones sobre la explicación evolutiva en ciencias cognitivas: El origen de la cognición social humana como estudio de caso

  • Andrés Segovia Cuéllar Universidad Nacional de Colombia.

Resumen

 Desde el planteamiento original de la teoría de la selección natural por Charles Darwin, han sido múltiples las disciplinas científicas que han incluido explicaciones evolutivas en sus dominios de investigación. Sin embargo, es común encontrar una adhesión íntegra e irrevocable a las ideas de la síntesis evolutiva moderna en estas disciplinas, particularmente en las ciencias humanas y cognitivas que se sustentan biológicamente. En este trabajo se presentará una discusión breve sobre las posibles falencias que los argumentos evolutivos tradicionales presentan a la hora de construir hipótesis sobre la evolución social humana. En un primer momento, fue relevante el planteamiento de un mecanismo diferencial, adquirido como adaptación cognitiva, que permitía al ser humano representar los estados mentales de otros individuos y con base en ello predecir su comportamiento. Avanzaremos en la explicación del comportamiento social sugiriendo más alternativas explicativas que surgen de la crítica a la tradición adaptacionista y genética en ciencias biológicas, y al individualismo metodológico de las ciencias cognitivas. Se discutirá de forma breve y comprimida en qué medida los estudios sobre la crianza cooperativa parecen mostrar una relación entre este fenómeno natural de parentalidad y la emergencia de conductas sociales sofisticadas que posee el género humano desde etapas tempranas del desarrollo, y que el resto de ejemplares homínidos existentes sólo desarrolla dependiendo de complejas variables ambientales. Sistemas de desarrollo donde convergen herencias morfológicas, capacidades motoras y factores socio-ecológicos, serían el escenario explicativo ideal para los cuestionamientos revisados.

Biografía del autor/a

Andrés Segovia Cuéllar, Universidad Nacional de Colombia.
Candidato a Magíster en Filosofía, Facultad de Ciencias Humanas, Universidad Nacional de Colombia. Psicólogo de formación egresado de la misma institución. Investigador en antropología evolutiva y psicología del desarrollo humano. Docente programa de psicología, Corporación Universitaria Minuto de Dios-Regional Soacha. Miembro del grupo "Ética, Comportamiento y Evolución", Facultad de Ciencias Humanas, Universidad Nacional de Colombia.

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Publicado
2016-12-28
Sección
Artículos de Revisión