Riggs v. Palmer Case

Analysis from the Philosophy of Law

Abstract

This paper analyzes the case Riggs v. Palmer, decided by the New York Court of Appeals in 1889. The case concerns a grandson, Elmer Palmer, who murders his grandfather, Francis Palmer, in order to receive the inheritance. The consequence of such an act for inheritance purposes were not contemplated in New York´s laws. This is a classic case in American law books, that in Spanish, became known by the law philosopher Ronald Dworkin. In the first instance, the inheritance is granted to Elmer, governing a mechanical application of the rule. The case reaches the New York Court of Appeals: the minority vote insists on applying the law as a rule; the majority decision, on the other hand, denies granting the inheritance to Elmer, mainly recognizing the existence of a principle not explicitly legislated. The normative and law-philosophical arguments given by both the minority and the majority vote are investigated, in light of the thought of classical, modern and contemporary authors. It is concluded that, in difficult cases – contrary to positivism - the connection between law and morality is unavoidable and necessary; this means anchoring in moral judgments that must seek moral objectivism and, therefore, must be subjected to the test of rational discourse.