Managerialism under weak regulations and strong organizational culture: The case of Prosecutors in charge of corruption cases in Peru

Authors

  • Wilson Hernández Breña Universidad de Lima (Peru)

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.24215/18522971e013

Keywords:

Culture; General prosecutors; management; regulations

Abstract

In 2011, Peruvian General Prosecutors in charge of corruption cases were clustered, after successful previous experiences in the civil jurisdiction. Clustering works by making efficiency –not quality– a priority and sharing administrative and investigation tasks among prosecutors led by a coordinator. In practice, clustering rarely achieved efficiency. In this article, we analyze how vague clustering regulations and an organizational culture that disregarded clustering created incentives that fostered four management styles influenced by two coordinators’ characteristics (communication and proactivity). Knowing that organizational culture creates incentives, especially in times of transition (like the clustering and the adoption of a new Code of Criminal Procedures), we don’t overestimate culture nor better regulations as solutions. It is the interaction between them what offers a better space for public policies seeking efficiency but also quality in General Prosecutors’ Office work.

Author Biography

  • Wilson Hernández Breña, Universidad de Lima (Peru)

    Universidad de Lima (Perú)

References

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Published

2017-11-03

Issue

Section

Dossier: Current studies on criminal justice

How to Cite

Hernández Breña, W. (2017). Managerialism under weak regulations and strong organizational culture: The case of Prosecutors in charge of corruption cases in Peru. Law and Social Sciences, 1(17), 145-163. https://doi.org/10.24215/18522971e013