Clausewitz: a guerra como instrumento de política e a intenção hostil como risco à deterioração da política e emergência da guerra absoluta

Authors

  • Cosme Oliveira Moura Junior Instituto de Relaciones Internacionales - Facultad de Ciencias Jurídicas y Sociales (UNLP).

Abstract

This paper discusses the theory of War of Clausewitz (2005) and its implications in the study of this phenomenon as an instrument of policy. We start from the premise that there is a need for rational control of war and develop an analysis of the dialogues with the concepts of rationality and action of Weber (1969), discussions of Aron (2002) about war for glory in order to interpret the nuances of the civil war in Rwanda and the Arab-Israeli conflict. In general we see that war, as outlined by the Clausewitzian theory, marks a political rationality that must be controlled by the leadership itself in order to prevent it from becoming a passion for exterminating the enemy or political suicide (total war or extermination war).

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Published

2012-12-20

How to Cite

Moura Junior, C. O. (2012). Clausewitz: a guerra como instrumento de política e a intenção hostil como risco à deterioração da política e emergência da guerra absoluta. International Relations, 21(43). Retrieved from https://revistas.unlp.edu.ar/RRII-IRI/article/view/622

Issue

Section

Estudios