Belief bias in deductive reasoning with syllogisms
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.24215/2422572Xe153Keywords:
logic and reasoning, cognitive biases, motivated reasoning, rationality, belief biasAbstract
The aim of this paper is to analyze belief bias in an argument evaluation task. Belief bias has been characterized as the tendency for people to consider valid arguments with believable conclusions and invalid arguments with unbelievable conclusions. We designed and applied a syllogism evaluation task where the response times used to evaluate each argument were recorded, in order to verify certain predictions of mental model theory and dual processes theories. The results show a strong belief bias, more accentuated regarding the evaluation of invalid syllogisms. In relation to the response times, the data obtained are related to dual processes theories, in particular, to the serial model. However, these results contradict the prediction of mental model theory on the increase of latency to evaluate valid syllogisms.
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