Entorno sociocultural y desarrollo humano: reflexiones desde las diferencias culturales en teoría de la mente

Ana

doi:10.24215/2422572Xe141

Autores

Ana Departamento Interfacultativo de Psicología Evolutiva y de la Educación, Facultad de Psicología, Universidad Autónoma de Madrid (España) https://orcid.org/0000-0002-0397-2513

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.24215/2422572Xe141

Palavras-chave:

teoria da mente, desenvolvimento cognitivo, diferenças culturais, falsa crença, avaliação psicológica

Resumo

A teoria da mente (TM) é um marco importante do desenvolvimento humano, pois permite a compreensão das habilidades fundamentais para uma comunicação eficaz e a participação social. Muitas das pesquisas recentes baseam-se no estudo de falsa crença como um indicador representativo de sua evolução, mas isso negligencia a natureza complexa do fenômeno, onde o desenvolvimento depende da organização gradual de múltiplos aspetos. Embora haja um consenso quanto ao caráter multifacetado da TM, os processos relacionados com seu desenvolvimento têm sido pouco explorados além das culturas ocidentais, especialmente com foco em amostras populacionais norteamericanas e europeias. Este artigo discute as evidências atuais sobre as diferenças culturais existentes nos padrões de desenvolvimento e tempos de adquisição da TM, bem como sobre as dificuldades que a diversidade limitada de tarefas que têm sido tradicionalmente usadas para sua avaliação pode representar em termos de validade e generalização dos resultados.

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Biografia do Autor

Ana, Departamento Interfacultativo de Psicología Evolutiva y de la Educación, Facultad de Psicología, Universidad Autónoma de Madrid (España)

Ana Moreno Núñez es doctora en Psicología con mención internacional y profesora en el Departamento de Psicología Evolutiva y de la Educación dela Universidad Autónoma de Madrid (España). Su actividad investigadora se centra en los procesos de desarrollo cognitivo y comunicativo en la primera infancia bajo la mediación de los adultos y sus acciones, tanto en el contexto del hogar como en la escuela infantil. Es en este ámbito en el que coordina actualmente el proyecto “Influencia de las dinámicas musicales y las interacciones triádicas tempranas en los procesos de aprendizaje en Educación Infantil” (MusicalETI), financiado por la Agencia Estatal de Investigación y el Ministerio de Ciencia e Innovación del Gobierno de España. Se especializa en análisis microgenéticos, los cuales resultan de especial utilidad para explicar y comprender los sutiles cambios que se producen en el desarrollo del niño a lo largo de sus primeros años de vida. Ha realizado estancias internacionales de investigación en Suecia (Lund University, 2012-2013) y ha sido investigadora postdoctoral en el National Institute of Education de Singapur (2016-2018). Además, ejerce como editora asociada de las revistas Pedagogies: An International Journal y Frontiers in Psychology, en la especialidad Developmental Psychology.

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